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On ne peut pas pretendre non plus que tout autre employeur, 
place dans une meme situation de faits, n'aurait pu obtenir de 
meilleurs resultats dans ses demarches. 
Si tant est que la defense d'impossibilite puisse a l'occasion 
constituer un moyen de defense valable contre une infraction 
de ce genre, j'en viens a la conclusion ici que l'appelante n'a 
pas fait la demonstration d'une impossibilite qui puisse donner 
ouverture a pareille excuse. 
Par ces motifs, le tribunal declare l'~inculpee coupable de !'in-
fraction et la condamne aux frais du present appel. 
Vu qu'il n'y a pas appel de la peine imposee, le tribunal rend 
executoire immediatement la peine imposee en premiere in-
stance. 
AN EVIDENCE CODE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
by 
PAUL ROTHSTEIN* 
An address opening the Conference on Current Trends 
in !ENidence, Dalhous,ie University, 26th November 
197,6** 
Let me say how pleased I am to be here in Canada and how 
pleased I am at the hospitality that's been shown me thus far. 
I think it's most indulgent of you to consider the American 
Evidence Code which, I think, does have more relevance than 
might appear at first glance. This is because our Code, called 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, is about 50 per cent or perhaps 
even 60 or 70 per cent, the same as your proposed Code. Much 
of it ~is almost verbatim. 
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., author 
of books and articles on evidence and trials, advisor to the United 
States Senate Judiciary Committee in a number of projects, including 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, consultant and reporter for the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and var-
ious law revision and legal education projects. 
**Editor's note: Professor Rothstein's address was the first of a group 
of excellent addresses given at the conference by practitioners, judges 
and professors concerning the present law of evidence and the Law 
Reform Commission of Canada's Evidence Code. These papers will 
be published shortly in book form and will be available from the 
Public Services Committee at Dalhousie Law School. 
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We have had this Code in operation now in the United States 
for about a year and a half. So in many ways it's a little early 
to be examining its effects. Nevertheless we do have some 
base of experience under it, from which to speak. 
I am going to be somewhat unorthodox and take things out 
of order. I will reserve discussion of the background of our 
Code, how it came to be, and what courts it governs, until the 
end of my remarks. Right now I will discuss a specific area 
of our Code, the sections dealing with expert testimony and 
opinion evidence which are almost precisely identical in our 
Code and your proposed Code. In our Code it's called Article 
7. You will understand that when I refer to Article 7, I am 
also referring to your sections 6,7 to 73, which are the an-
alogous sections. 
I will not say now why I am going to take things out of 
order. That will emerge as we proceed. 
PROVISIONS ON OPINIONS AND ExPERTS 
Let me briefly outline how Article 7 and your analogous 
provisions operate. I will, in this outline, present a composite 
picture which includes a reading of the sections in Article 7 
as they operate together as an integrated whole, rather than a 
section-by-section treatment. The picture will also be based on 
relevant case interpretations, which I assume would be similar 
under your Code. 
Proceeding, then, along these lines, reading Article 7 from 
its four corners, putting it all together and cranking into it 
the case interpretations, I see in Article 7 and your analogous 
provisions seven great liberalizations over traditional existing 
evidence law in the area of experts and opinions. By liberaliza-
tion, I mean a broadening, an increase in admissibility. 
The first great liberalization has to do with lay opinions. 
Lay opinions under the new Code are allowed whenever they 
would be "helpful", provided that they are rationally based in 
the witness's perception. All that latter requirement means 
is that the witness must have first-hand, personal knowledge 
of the matter that he is speaking about. Thus, we now allow into 
evidence opinions on the part of lay persons, in a much freer 
fashion than formerly. No longer is the rule the traditional 
restrictive "collective facts" rule. That was the former rule 
in the United States that a lay person could only express an 
opinion on the stand if it wa:s impossible or terribly imprac-
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tical to express what he has observed in any other fashion. A 
lay person was allowed to say that so-and-,so was joking; that 
so-and-so looked like he wa:s dying; that such-and-such pro-
duce was rotten; that such-and-such was a strong fence or a 
strong person; or that so-and-so appeared sane. These are all 
conclusions, inferences or opinions, and they would have been 
barred but for the fact that they were held to come within 
the collective facts rule. They a:re a shorthand rendition of 
some underlying, practically inarticulable facts. The only 
time a lay person could express an opinion was when a short-
hand rendition was absolutely necessary and essential and very 
difficult or impossible to express any other way. This is no 
longer the law. The new rule permits the opinion whenever 
the opinion would be "helpful". This is the very word used. 
The second great liberalizaton expands who will be consi-
dered "experts". The category will include not just profession-
als, scientists and people with specialized university degrees. 
It will include also the so-called "skilled" witnesses, such as 
bankers, farmers, police patrolmen or home owners, testifying 
in the,ir particular area of experience. 
The third great liberalization expands what subjects are 
proper subjects for expert testimony. It used to be in the 
United States that the only proper subjects for expert testi-
mony were matters that were totally beyond lay ken. That's 
the way the test read, totally beyond lay ken. If a lay person 
knew anything about the area, had any knowledge in the area, 
then an expert could not testify in that area. Such testimony 
would be considered an invasion of the province of the jury. 
The new test is that an expert may testify in any area where 
he has "specialized knowledge" which would be "of assistance" 
to the jury or to the judge - a very broad, liberal, highly 
discretionary test. 
The fourth great liberalization has to do with the much 
maligned and much touted hypothetical question. Under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and your analogous provisions, no 
longer need expert testimony be presented in the stilted format 
of the hypothetical question. A hypothetical question usually 
takes something like the following form: "Now, assuming, 
doctor, that a patient comes to you with such-and-such and 
so-and-so and has a history of such-and-such and so-and-so, 
do you have an opinion, doctor, as to whether this will be 
permanent?" "Yes, I do." "What is that opinion?" (These 
hypothetical questions often run on for pages and pages, 
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Lawyers are fond of building into the hypothetical every con-
ceivable favourable fact in the case, using this as early argu-
mentation and propaganda.) No longer is that a necessary 
format for expressing expert opinion. 
There are now six alternative formats. I am putting to-
gether the cases and the wording of several of the sections 
in the Article. The six alternative formats are these: first 
of all, the traditional hypothetical given at trial; secondly, a 
hypothetical given to the expert before trial, perhaps in the 
privacy of the lawyers office, the expert then testifying on 
the stand based on that; thirdly, the expert's testimony can be 
based upon personal knowledge, fo~ example, he may be a doc-
tor who has made a personal examination of the patient and 
he testifies based upon that; fourthly, he might testify based 
upon reading the transcript in the case; fifthly, he may testify 
based on his attendance at the trial, sitting in the audience 
and listening to the fact witnesses; and sixthly, he can testify 
based upon a mixture of any of the above. Thus, the stilted 
hypothetical question is no longer a necessity. 
The fifth great liberalization is that an expert on the stand 
may rely on unadmitted and inadmissible materials in giving 
his opinion if they are of the kind that are "reasonably relied 
upon" by experts In the ,field. Thus he may base his opinion 
on inadmissible evidence, hearsay, documents that are not in 
evidence, documents that violate the best evidence or the 
authentication rule - any kind of inadmissible evidence -
provided that it is the kind that is "reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming inferences or opinions 
on the subject." Thus, a judgment of reasonableness has to be 
made here by the judge. A question could be raised: "Reason-
able for whom? - the court or these experts?" ; "Reasonable-
ness" has usually been held synonymous with ·"customary". 
You will notice that this principle is an end run around the 
hearsay rule. If an attorney has a piece of hearsay and has 
trouble getting it into evidence under the hearsay rule and 
cannot find an exception to the hearsay rule for it, then he 
might endeavour to find an expert who will base his opinion 
on the inadmissible hearsay. The attorney might then put the 
expert on the stand to recount not only his opinion but also the 
hearsay basis of his opinion. This has tremendous implications 
for getting into evidence studies; polls; surveys; second-hand 
statements, say, by patients, consultations with other doctors; 
books; articles; and other things of that sort that might other-
wise be inadmissible hearsay. 
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A primordial case interpreting this provision came down 
some months back. A police officer from the drug enforcement 
administration was allowed to testify as to the selling price of 
heroin in various cities of the world. He had found out the 
prices from other agents. Subsequent cases admitted studies -
government studies, private studies, university studies - and 
polls and surveys, even though the hearsay rule would have 
barred them. The idea is not new, but the new rules button 
it down. 
The sixth great liberalization has to do with disclosure of the 
facts and materials upon which the expert witness bases his 
opinion. It used to be in the United States, and probably here 
as well, that it was required that the expert give the basis for 
his opinion in the direct examination, so that the cross-ex-
aminer had some advanced warning and could decide whether or 
not to cross-examine, and if he decided to cross-examine, what 
tack to take. Sometimes it's the better part of discretion not 
to cross-examine an articulate expert. Our rules of evidence 
now say that this is no longer required; that the direct ex-
amination does not need to include the basis of the expert's 
opinion. The expert can give a bare opinion. Admittedly, in 
many cases the direct examiner will not proceed this way be-
cause a bare opinion is not very persuasive. But on occasion 
the direct examiner will not put a basis in on the direct ex-
amination, either because there is no very good basis or be-
cause there is a great basis and he would like the cross-ex-
aminer to trigger it. He may know from past experience with 
this cross-examiner that he can depend upon the cross-examiner 
to do just that. The cross-examiner can't keep his mouth shut. 
If the cross-examiner triggers the basis, it's very effective for 
the direct examiner, because it makes the expert look especially 
good, much better than if the basis had been put in on the 
direct examination. Under the new rule it is no longer required 
to put the basis in during the direct examination. 
Your rule is a little better on this score than ours. Your 
rule provides that the judge may or may not order that the 
basis be put in on the direct examination, and does not slant 
the language to indicate that such an order is the extraordinary 
case. In addition, yours provides for the parties to exchange in 
advance written summaries of expert testimony and its grounds, 
something that appears in our civil procedure law (but not our 
criminal procedure law). This has often proved inadequate be-
cause the statement in practice is frequently perfunctory. 
An Evidence Code: The American Experience 279 
The seventh great liberalization has to do with the so-called 
ultimate issue rule. This was the rule that provided that an 
opinion, be it an expert opinion or a lay opinion, could not be 
given in terms that smacked of, that sounded of, an ultimate 
issue in the case. This has been abolished by our new rules 
and your proposed rules. There is no longer a ban on opinions 
by experts or lay people expressed in terms of the ultimate is-
sue in the case. 
That is the final liberalization that I want to address in out-
lining the way that these provisions operate. 
Let us see how these seven great liberalizations interrelate 
with each other to produce results in particular cases. Let 
us take an automobile accidentologist. We seem to have a 
growing class of people called accident reconstruction experts 
in the United States, accidentologists, in many different areas, 
including industrial mishaps and collisions. Let us say that he 
wants to take the stand to testify about who caused an auto-
mobile accident. And he wants to say the Ford was at fault, 
or wasn't keeping a proper lookout. He wants to testify based 
not upon any personal observation that he had of the auto-
mobile accident, but based primarily upon bystanders' state-
ments. He has interviewed the bystanders and they tell him 
lots of things. He puts them all together. Are there any impe-
diments to this sort of thing coming in? It seems to be hear-
say; and he seems to be an expert of somewhat specious quali-
fications. Nevertheless with an appropriate judge he could over-
,come all the hurdles and get his evidence in. He could, first 
of all, convince the judge that this is a recognized field of ex-
pertise that has something "helpful", something "of assistance", 
to offer the trier of fact. He could) convince the judge that he 
does indeed have some "specialized knowledge". That's all 
that's required under the rule regarding his qualifications and 
the area he can testify in. It seems to me that he could con-
vince the judge that it would be more "helpful", of more "as-
sistance", to have this testimony than to not have it. So he 
meets that test. In addition, we have learned that he is allow-
ed to base his testimony on hearsay, provided that he convinces 
the judge that experts in this field reasonably rely upon this 
kind of hearsay, bystanders' statements. Let us say that he 
does so convince the judge. He says, "All us accidentologists 
rely all the time on this kind of bystanders' statements." The 
final impediment seems to be that he is expressing his conclu-
sion in terms of the ultimate issue in the case. He says the 
Ford was at fault; the Ford didn't keep a proper lookout. Well, 
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we saw that there is no longer a ban on ultimate opinions, opiQ 
nions on the ultimate issue in the case. So he overcomes that 
hurdle too. 
One additional hurdle might be mentioned. We have some-
thing in our rules near the outset, rule 403 (you have an an-
alogous rule), which I call "the big override". It states that 
notwithstanding anything else the rules provide, the judge can 
keep evidence out if in his discretion he finds that the pro-
bativity is substantially outweighed by the prejudice, the time 
consumption, the confusion, the misleadingness or similar fac-
tors. This is a very broad rule, phrased just like that, and the 
judge has discretion tq exercise it. But it seems to me that a 
judge might well decide - having made all these determina-
tions that Article 7 relating to experts is complied with in 
the case of this accidentologist - that the "big override", 
rule 403, is also complied with. He would admit the testimony 
into evidence. (While the drafter's comments try to assure 
us that it is not contemplated that such evidence should be 
admitted, there are no assurances in the text of the rules.) 
Let us take another case. Suppose a financial investigator 
from our Internal Revenue Service (our income tax people) 
takes the stand to testify that Mr. so-and-so is guilty of tax 
fraud, in just those terms. His conclusion, let us further as-
sume, is based upon his examination of bank records, i.e., 
doucuments that are not here, haven't been admitted, may not 
even be admissible, are not authenticated and don't comply 
with the best evidence rule. They may be hearsay and may 
not really meet the requirements of any exception, for all we 
know. And he works for the government - a party in inte-
rest. The rules are broad enough to permit this testimony, 
even though he is expressing an ultimate opinion that so-and-
so is guilty of tax fraud. 
A fortiori he could testify that Mr. so-and-so owns certain 
funds.' Let us say that is an important allegation in the case; 
that they are the defendant's funds and that the defendant 
tried to cover them up by all kinds of dummy corporations. 
The investigator could testify in terms of these allegations -
that the funds were Mr. so-and-so's, who tried to cover up 
with dummy corporations. The expert may never specify any 
facts underlying such a conclusion. Hopefully judges will not 
allow what we have been talking about, but there is a risk 
some will. 
The witness is testifying based upon inadmissible or un-
admitted evidence, but there is no ban on that. There is no 
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ban on ultimate conclusions. He is a specialist who has speGia-
lized knowledge. The judge could feel it is helpful and of as-
sistance to the trier of facts. So it all may come in. 
I take it you now have a feeling of disquietude and discom-
fort. Which brings us to my first reason for putting the early 
spotlight on Article 7, dealing with opinions and experts. It 
is my conviction that Article 7 will be the most important 
article in all the rules in 20th century and 21st century litiga-
tion. In today's world of increasing expertise and specializa-
tion, and increasingly complex technical issues that are beyond 
the ability of lay juries to resolve or to resolve expeditiously 
without expert help, expert testimony will be relied upon more 
and more as time goes on. At one and the same time Article 
7 has the greatest potential for good and also the greatest 
potential for harm and abuse in all the rules. 
On the good side, Article 7 opens the door to all sorts of 
valuable modern expertise which the courts have been barring 
by applying 18th century precedents to today's vastly more 
complex problems. Article 7 thus laudably brings courts into 
the 20th century. But in opening the door wider to expertise, 
more charlatans are also going to get in. There will be an 
avalanche of sociologists, economists, safety experts, employ-
ment discrimination experts, psychologists, etc. - some of 
them good and some of them bad. These rules give the court 
no concrete guidance in distinguishing the charlatans from the 
savants. Now, of course, a top-notch judge usually can dis-
tinguish between them under the standards provided in the 
rules. But in any system of law, are all the judges going to 
be top-notch? And we should remember that in the United 
States, while these rules bind only federal judges, they are 
being adopted in an increasing rate by the states. Many states 
that haven't adopted them are using them in an advisory 
fashion. In addition, administrative agencies are using them 
in an advisory capacity. Eventually many administrative agen-
cies will probably adopt them. Especially with respect to the 
states, you have to realize that judges who are on a very high 
level, and judges on the lower levels, are going to be using 
these rules. Both your highest, most learned judges and your 
J.P.'s are going to be using these rules. 
What the rules are saying here, and what I've illustrated 
with the accidentologist case and the bank examiner case, is 
that the rules ask you to trust the judge, trust the jury and 
trust the lawyers. Trust the judge to keep out unworthy ev-
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idence. Trust the jury to spot weaknesses in evidence that is 
admitted and to assess its weight correctly. Most importantly, 
trust the lawyers to point out the weaknesses in the evidence 
so that the judge and jury can spot them. So there is a heavy 
onus on the lawyers when these rules go into effect. 
It's obvious that the quality of the bench and bar is critical 
under these new rules. I know the quality of our federal bench 
and our federal bar and I know that <it is very high. I assume 
the same is true of the courts that will be using your proposed 
rules. I leave it to you as to whether you feel that these provi-
sions that I've outlined can be administered properly. I might 
point out that while these rules may seem to give the judge 
too much flexibility, I would warn against the opposite ex-
treme - a rigid specification that unduly hems him in. I leave 
it to you to ask yourselves whether you think these provisions 
that I have outlined draw the right balance between too much 
rigid specificity (which would unduly tie the hands of the 
judge) and uncontrolled discretion. Do they draw the line 
between the two in the proper place? 
TRENDS IN THE RULES AS A WHOLE 
All of this brings me to my main reason for addressing 
Article 7, dealing with opinions and experts. My main reason 
is this: that what is true of Article 7, in the senses that I have 
addressed, is also true throughout the entire body of the rules, 
both yours and ours. I see two themes in the new rules, yours 
and ours, that are strongly illustrated by Article 7 and the an-
alogous provisions in your Code. These two themes are ad-
missibility and discretion. Throughout their length and breadth 
these rules favour admissibility and grant strong doses of dis-
cretion. 
Admissibility is manifest right in the fundamental definition 
of relevance in both Codes. Your Code says relevant evidence 
is evidence that has any tendency in reason to persuade. This 
is a very low threshold favouring admissibility. Ours says any 
evidence that has any tendency to increase in any degree the 
probability of a provable proposition being true or untrue is 
relevant. All it has to do is increase or decrease the probabi-
lity in any degree- a fraction of 1 per cent -and it's rele-
vant. In addition, before the judge can exclude evidence pur-
suant to the "big override" referred to earlier, he must find 
that the relevance, or probativity, is substantially outweighed 
- not just outweighed - by the other policy factors (time 
prejudice, etc.). This is so in both Codes. 
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The admissibility theme is further illustrated in both Codes 
by the fact that they severely limit witness incompetencies. And 
both allow you to impeach your own witness, contrary to form-
er law. Both substantially erode the hearsay rule. The authen-
tication of documents requirement is whittled down in both. 
There is an expanded list of self-authenticating documents, do-
cuments that on their face are authenticated. The best ev-
idence rule is radically altered - xeroxes, photocopies, are free-
ly admitted on a par with originals in most cases. 
All this means admissibility. And there are many, many 
more provisions that increase admissibility, in addition to the 
opinions and experts sections that I previously addressed. 
What about the theme of discretion? The knell of discre-
tion is sounded near the very beginning of your rules and 
ours, in what I have called the "big override", which grants 
the judge wide discretion to balance probativity against pre-
judice, time consumption, misleadingness and similar factors. 
In another section in both Codes the judge is given discretion 
over the order and manner of presentation of evidence and 
the examination of witnesses. That's your rule 58- we have 
the same thing. This means he has discretion over the scope 
of cross-examination, the scope and permissibility of rebuttal 
and surrebuttal, the number of witnesses and things of that 
nature. And he has in both Codes discretion over whether or 
not and when to allow leading questions. He's given some 
guidance but not too much. 
Your privilege provisions are a prime example of what we 
are addressing at this point. Under some of the privilege pro-
visions in your Code the judge is to weigh the need for the 
testimony against the public interest in privacy. Under others 
he is to weigh the public interest in privacy against the pub-
lic interest in the administration of justice. Under your sec-
tions on illegally obtained evidence, he is to balance human 
dignity, social values and the administration of justice against 
the seriousness of the case and the need for the evidence. At 
one point under illegally obtained evidence, the judge is to 
gauge whether the administration of justice would be thrown 
into disrepute, a factor which cuts both ways, depending upon 
whether one thinks letting a criminal off, or using illegally ob-
tained evidence, is the more disreputable, something upon which 
opinion seems divided. I am using the actual words of your 
Code. They are broad, engendering much discretion. 
Discretion and breadth of phrasing engendering discretion 
appear at every turn, not merely in the sections on experts and 
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opinions and the other sections I have referred to. Indeed, in 
the United 'States people have called our Federal Rules of Evi-
dence the "Federal Non-Rules of Evidence". I think that is an 
exaggeration. But rit is true that these rules are actually not 
rules but guidelines, standards, only. 
These twin themes of admissibility and discretion have cer-
tain implications in addition to those I've already mentioned. 
The ones I've already mentioned are the three "trusts" (trust 
the judge, trust the jury and trust the lawYers) and the im-
portance of the quality of the bench and the bar. Let me men-
tion some other implications. 
First of all, it seems to me that broad discretion means that 
even under the Code there will still be considerable diversity 
from circuit to circuit, district to district, judge to judge, which 
rules and codes are meant to eliminate. Discretion and broad 
phrases engender differences of opinion as to how it should 
be exercised. 
Secondly, discretion means that all of evidence law will not 
be between the two covers of the Code. Old cases and new 
cases will still play a tremendous role, despite some exagger-
ated promises for a code. It is fatuous to say, as the be-
ginning of your Code seems to imply, that the common law 
is abolished. It cannot be abolished where you have broad 
provisions and discretion like this. You have got to give such 
rules content by reference to the old cases and the new cases. 
The next implication that I see ~is that discretion means that 
dissatisfied litigants will be able to focus much of their dissatis-
faction on the judge personally. He cannot say that the result 
was entirely compelled by law. The litigant can say, "Wait a 
minute, you've been given tremendous discretion to exercise as 
you want here." This is somewhat contrary to the historical 
trend toward a rule of law and not of men - a trend that, ad-
mittedly, has not been constant and perhaps cannot or should 
not be carried to an extreme. 
The next implication is that while discretion gives the trial 
judge much more latitude than he formerly had, it also gives 
some new licence to appellate judges. They will be allowed to 
reverse distasteful decisions for nothing more precise than 
abuse of discretion, in many instances. 
Fifthly, it seems to me that as lawYers, your ability to plan, 
predict and advise; to proportion expenses to a case in ad-
vance; and to give a reading of what it will cost and of the 
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probabilities of outcome, is impaired under a code that gives 
broad discretion, because discretion means uncertainty. How 
can you precisely plan your case if you don't know what ev-
idence is going to be admissible because it turns on the discre-
tion of the judge? How can you predict for your client with 
any degree of probability what the result will be when that 
all depends on what evidence is admissible and you don't know 
precisely what will be admissible? How can you advise the 
client as to whether to go into litigation or not, and how much 
to spend? How can you give a reading as to how much it will 
cost, and plan the costs? All this depends upon what evidence 
will be admitted at trial. You are somewhat impaired to the 
extent that there is discretion and uncertainty. 
And, finally, there are going to be more appeals, at least 
in the short run. You've got a lot of broad phrases; a lot of 
discretion. We're going to have to get appellate courts to tell 
us what are the limits of the discretion, what is an abuse of 
. discretion, what the broad phrases mean. Furthermore, when-
ever you enact a new code, laWYers have a heightened sense of 
the subject, of evidence. For example, in the United States we 
have been giving lectures all over the country - laWYers are 
suddenly very interested in evidence. They might never have 
been interested in it before but we have a new Code, so they're 
very interested. Therefore, they study it, they go to seminars. 
they read books. They have a heightened awareness of ev-
idence matters. It makes them more appeal-minded. Codes use 
new words. Nobody knows for sure what the new words mean. 
So they say, "Let's ask the appellate court." There are going 
to be more appeals for a while. 
This is a pretty gloomy picture. I seem to be saying that the 
new rules are and will be a failure; that they will not accom-
plish what codification is intended to accomplish. But that is 
not my message. Rather, I am pleading for a realistic rather 
than an exaggerated expectation as to what rules of this kind 
will accomplish. They may not accomplish the goals of codi-
fication 100 per cent. They may only accomplish it 50 or 70 
per cent. Perhaps they will need amending before enactment 
and from time to time after enactment as they operate and 
problems are revealed. But, nevertheless, codified rules of 
evidence of some kind are, on the whole, desirable and salutary 
in my view. Codified rules at the very least cause all the judges 
to shoot toward the same target. Authority will all be gathered 
together in convenient annotations to rules by the glossators. 
Law students will study the Code, which is a very effective 
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teaching tool. They will probably learn better, and it will be 
uniform law they will be learning and subsequently spreading. 
They will be equipped to practise under it. It will be a con-
veniet focus for law schools and for the continuing legal edu-
cation of practitioners. Interest in learning the law of evidence 
with precision will be stimulated. Thus, I think that under a 
code, the system will tend towards simplification, uniformity, 
professionalism and expedition, though the goals will never be 
accomplished 100 per cent. 
In the meantime, when a code is adopted, I urge that lawyers 
not give up arguing the fine points of interpretation for their 
clients and that they not give up engaging in the sophisticated 
use and distinguishing of case decisions in order to give content 
to generalized words like "helpful", "of assistance" and the 
other broad words that constantly recur throughout the Code. 
The reason I say that lawyers should continue to do this is so 
that the courts may ultimately decide what is the best inter-
pretation of each provision in the Code, and so that the drafters 
may make amendments when needed. It is a lawyer's duty, not 
only to his client but to society as well, to do this. Only then 
can we be confident that the courts have been presented with 
all the alternative interpretations of a word or phrase and that 
they have been adequately argued. Only then can we feel as-
sured that the court has selected the right alternative and that 
we have the best interpretation possible. If this is re-introduc-
ing technicality into a code that was meant to sweep away 
technicality, then so be it. It is a good thing, I say. And it is 
unavoidable in a code using such broad phrases. 
I know I don't need to exhort lawyers to do this. A vigorous 
bar will do this kind of argumentation wherever there is vague-
ness or generality in a code or any possible ambiguity. They 
will argue the pros and cons of past resolutions from the old 
cases and from the common law. And there are bound to be 
conflicting cases coming down under the Code which lawyers 
can also argue from, because ambiguity, broad phrases, or dis-
cretion engender conflicting differences of opinion by different 
judges. This process is sometimes referred to as undue tech-
nicality. But the needs and problems giving rise to it cannot 
be ignored and will not go away. It is unavoidable unless the 
Code is so detailed as to answer every question in advance. 
Such specificity is impossible and undesirable for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is that the drafters cannot pos-
sibly foresee every contingency or be alerted to all the pros and 
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cons of every interpretation in advance. Neither Code attempts 
anything like that. 
SOME EFFECTS ON THE DAY-TO-DAY PRACTICE OF LAW 
I would like to turn for a moment to the practical effects that 
our Code has had on the practice of litigation law and that your 
Code can be expected to have. My own experience, plus my 
interviews with other attorneys, tells me that one principal 
effect of the new Code is that more preparation of cases is re-
quired. Certain sloppy practices which were always dangerous 
to the sloppy practitioner who practised them have been ren-
dered doubly dangerous under the Code. This will be true of 
your Code as well as ours because the provisions I am going 
to address are v;irtually the same. 
Let me illustrate what I mean. Your opponents' experts will 
no longer have to give you their basis - their materials and 
their facts - on the direct examination. I have already ad-
verted to this. It means that if you're going to make an in-
formed decision as to whether or not to cross-examine and what 
line of attack to take in your cross-examination, you're going 
to have to do some home,work (probably beyond the cursory 
summary of expert testimony and grounds your opponent may 
have provided). You can't say "I can rely on my wits and listen 
to the direct examination, that's enough to supplement the 
summary, and I'll fashion my cross-examination on my feet." 
You can't do that anymore. I know none of you do this kind 
of thing. But some cases aren't expensive enough, do not have 
big enough stakes, to warrant spending the client's money on 
tremendous pre-trial investigation and discovery; or the client 
may be impecunious. So sometimes you will be tempted, per-
haps even somewhat justifiably, into one of these practices to 
some extent. But it must be recognized that such a practice is 
more disadvantageous than ever under the Code. Criminal 
cases are especially troublesome on this score in the United 
States because pre-trial investigation and discovery by the ac-
cused is handicapped not only by lack of funds, normally, but 
also by inadequate legal procedures for discovery. 
What about opponents' lay witnesses? Can you sit back and 
say, "I won't do very much homework and discovery, I'll just 
listen to what he says on direct examination and then I'll cross-
examine him based on that. I can rely on my wits." Can you 
do that safely? No, you can't, because of something that I call 
"the case of the invisible witness". It goes as follows. The lay 
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witness on the stand may say not "I saw the Ford go through 
the red light", but rather "Mr. Jones told me the Ford went 
through the red light." You can't cross-examine Mr. Jones. He 
isn't here. He's the invisible witness. So you cross-examine 
this witness who is on the stand. But the witness on the stand 
says "I don't know. Don't ask me those questions. Mr. Jones 
said it. I don't know." It is apparent that you can't effective-
ly cross-examine concerning the matter. Now you say to me, 
"Wait a minute, that's hearsay." But the point is that the new 
Codes, both of them, yours and ours, restrict the hearsay rule. 
More of this type of secondhand material by invisible witnesses 
is going to get into evidence. Thus, you've been caught un-
awares. You haven't done your pre-trial discovery and investi-
gation, which would have shown you that this witness is going 
to testify to hearsay. It would have identified for you the de-
clarant, Mr. Jones, the invisible witness. Then you could go 
get him, depose him, interview him, perhaps bring him to trial, 
or at least gather evidence on his credibility and the circum-
stances surrounding him and the observations he made. If you 
had done your homework properly that's what you could do. 
But you didn't. You sat back, you said, "Well, I'm going to 
learn it all in the direct examination just on my wits, do the 
whole case in a really great cross-examination like Perry 
Mason." You can't do that with impunity, especially under 
the new Code. The cross-examination will be ineffective in this 
kind of situation, which can be expected to recur frequently. 
Once again, little allowance is made for cases where it may be 
impractical or impossible to conduct extensive investigation 
and discovery. 
To the extent that the Codes provide for notice to the other 
side of hearsay that will be used, the problems respecting "in-
visible witnesses" spoken of above are somewhat, but not en-
tirely, alleviated. While the notice may identify the declarant 
(the "invisible witness") and furnish something of the sub-
stance of his statement, discovery and investigation is still 
needed to ferret out any weaknesses in it, and calling or in-
vestigating the declarant still entails trouble and expense and 
it may even prove to be impossible. Further, not all situations 
where hearsay can be used are covered by the notice require-
ment, although the notice requirement in your Code is broader 
than the one in ours. 
What about documents? How about the lawyer who says, 
"I'm not going to do too much homework and discovery on 
my opponent's documents. When my opponent brings in the 
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documents, I'll have enough to prepare a good attack on the 
documents. After all, he's got to present me with the original. 
The original prevents double xeroxing, reveals any fraud-
ulence, displays for close scrutiny the original signature, re-
veals any erasures, etc. Furthermore, he's got to present an 
authenticating witness for the document, so I'll cross-examine 
that authenticating witness and that will reveal any problems. 
Why should I do pre-trial discovery, investigation and other 
homework?" The problem with this approach is that the new 
rules do not require an authenticating witness for an expanded 
list of self-authenticating documents, and the new rules do not 
require the production of the original. Xeroxes will do the 
trick in most cases. So this lawyer is out of luck. Again, it is 
probably no excuse that there may have been practical reasons 
for failure to investigate and discover, although the judge has 
some discretion to require originals. 
Turning to the next practice, some of you may have said to 
yourself, "I'm not going to waste the client's and my resources 
by preparing my own expert witness very thoroughly. After 
all, he is extremely intelligent and articulate. I have worked 
with him before. He's appeared in cases for me before. I'll 
just hand him my file on the case and I'll tell him to go home 
and prepare from it. Then he can come and testify. That's 
an economical way to do it." This is very risky under the new 
Codes, because they provide that documents used by witnesses 
to prepare themselves, either before taking the stand or on the 
stand, may be inspected by the adverse party. By giving the 
witness your case file, you risk exposing it to adverse inspection. 
Our Code states that adverse inspection of documents used to 
prepare before taking the stand is discretionary with the judge. 
Your Code makes it mandatory if requested. So this practice 
is especially risky under your Code. Neither Code tells us what 
to do if privilege conflicts with this rule. What if there is a 
privilege surrounding parts of this file? (The most common 
privileges invoked here might be the privilege for the attorney's 
work-product and the attorney-client communications privilege; 
but other privileges are also conceivable.) The rules them-
selves are silent on this question. I would assume you've waived 
privilege by giving the file to a witness to prepare himself. (We 
have one cryptic and inconclusive reference to this problem in 
our legislative history of the rule.) 
I suggest that you don't prepare lay witnesses in this fashion 
either. I know there's a tendency to do that sometimes if you 
think the witness is intelligent, but the same risk applies. 
19-CR 
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There is another practice, too, I would like to mention, which 
is affected by the new rules. Suppose that you have an expert 
witness and again you want to save time and money, yours and 
the client's, and you don't want to work with the witness ex-
tensively before trial. So you tell him to sit in the courtroom 
and listen to the other witnesses as they testify. That will give 
him a good picture of the case and then he can give his opinion 
on the standi based upon what he's heard. The difficulty is, you 
might run up against the sequestration rule. Both your Code 
and ours have a sequestration rule that provides that witnesses 
may not listen to each other. If a request is made, sequestra-
tion is mandatory; the judge has no discretion. The mandatory 
feature is odd. Under former law the judge had discretion. 
The theme of the Code in general is discretion. Yet here, where 
discretion would be appropriate, the Code removes the judge's 
discretion. (Your rule is more precise than ours in one respect: 
it extends sequestration to provide for an order that a witness 
shall not be informed by other persons what the witnesses in 
the courtroom said. That is a logical extension of the seques-
tration rule. If we are going to bar witnesses from sitting in 
the courtroom, we should also instruct that they are not to be 
informed of what went on in the courtroom secondhand. Our 
rule does not expressly state the latter, so it is possible one 
might circumvent our sequestration rule by informing the wit-
ness out in the hall what is going on in the courtroom. A ques,. 
tion can be raised also as to the permissibility of a witness 
reading transcripts, attending depositions, etc.) 
This sequestration rule might bar your expert from sitting 
in and listening to witnesses. There is an exception to the 
sequestration rule under both Codes, for the situation where 
it is "essential" that the witness sit in. But I can see a judge 
taking the position that there are other ways for your expert 
to testify. For example, the expert can be given a hypothetical 
question. So it is not "essential" that he sit in. Furthermore, 
the attorney may not need the expert's advice throughout the 
case because it may not be a very technical case. So his pre-
sence in the courtroom isn't "essential" in that sense. And 
the point your expert is going to testify on may not be a criti-
cally central point. So it is not "essential" in that sense either. 
Therefore be might well be barred from the courtroom. 
I would suggest that the way around this is to argue that the 
opinion and expert rules, which I addressed earlier, actually 
contemplate this efficient economical way of presenting expert 
testimony. If you want to get away from the hypothetical 
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question, as those rules attempt to do, one of the best ways to 
do it is to let the expert sit in and hear the facts. I would 
suggest that the policy of those rules should supervene and 
override the policy of the sequestration rule in this kind of 
case. Anyway, the policy of the sequestration rule is to prevent 
fact witnesses from influencing each other, a danger that is 
not really present here. 
One other practical effect that the rules have had on the 
practising lawyer, that I should mention, is that now lawyers 
are finding it more important than ever to obtain and discover 
previous statements of witnesses. The taking of or search for 
such statements becomes a critical kind of homework, a critical 
kind of pre-trial investigation and discovery. For now a case 
can be won or lost on those previous statements, because pre-
vious statements of witnesses are admissible substantively, af-
firmatively, under the new Codes. Before, that usage of them 
would have been inadmissible hearsay. Under former law all 
they could be used for was impeachment and credibility. Im-
peachment and credibility are important but not as tremen-
dously important as being able to use them substantively as 
well as for impeachment and credibility. So it's doubly import-
tant to get those pre-trial statements. I submit to you that 
my experience has been that this provision favours the pro-
secution. When you have the burden of proof to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the distinction between substantive 
use and credibility or ,impeachment use becomes very impor-
tant. And the prosecution is in a marvellous position to get 
former statements of witnesses, to use the grand jury and in-
vestigation to get former statements of witnesses. The pro-
secutors have seen the opportunity under the new Code and 
are seizing it. 
THE BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN CODE 
Now I want to talk about background: how our Code came 
to be, what courts it governs, that sort of thing. 
On 1st July 1915, about a year and a half ago, our federal 
courts, not our state courts, went under this new system of 
evidence, the new Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern in 
all civil and criminal cases. There is verylittle distinction made 
in the new rules between civil and criminal cases. 
These new rules replaced our uncodified system of common 
law evidence rulings in federal courts, which rulings often 
varied from district to district and circuit to circuit, penalizing 
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the attorney who ventured to practise outside his home terri-
tory and inhibiting the rotation of judges amongst the federal 
courts around the country. On evidence matters, sometimes 
the federal courts resorted to state precedent, sometimes to 
federal precedent, sometimes to a mixture. This was the situa-
tion before the Code. The law was hard to find and older at-
torneys familiar with local peculiarities had a definite ad-
vantage over newcomers. I venture to say this situation that 
I've sketched in the United States before the Code is probably 
the situation that exists here in Canada now, to a somewhat 
lesser degree. 
The new rules in the United States only govern proceedings 
in federal courts. But they govern virtually all proceedings in 
federal courts. Federal courts in our system entertain basi-
cally three types of cases: (1) criminal violations of federal 
statutes, i.e., statutes passed by Congress in areas that our 
constitution specially gives over to the federal legislature (the 
Congress), such as the federal income tax or the regulation of 
interstate commerce, including such things as securities law, 
anti-trust and the regulation of common carriers; (2) civil 
cases that involve what is called a federal question, e.g., civil 
suits under any of the congressional statutes that I have just 
mentioned, or a suit involving our constitution; and (3) civil 
cases that do not involve any federal congressional or federal 
constitutional law and by all rights would be in a state court 
but for the fact that the parties are citizens of different states. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence govern all of these cases in 
federal courts. Virtually all other cases are in state courts. 
These include, generally speaking, criminal violations of state-
enacted statutes, ordinary civil tort, contract and property suits, 
matters of family law and ordinary commercial litigation. Now, 
the state courts are not bound by the new Federal Rules of 
Evidence but six of the states have recently enacted evidence 
codes similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence and three more 
are very close to doing so. Since these codes are patterned on 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, they should facilitate the abil-
ity of state practitioners to function in federal courts and vice 
vice versa, and I think that is an important and salutary by-
product. 
I should add that state judges in states that are not adopting 
the codes are nevertheless using the Federal Rules of Evidence 
in an advisory capacity as a sort of textbook. Federal courts 
were doing this before the formal enactment of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, and federal administrative tribunals are 
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doing it today, even though the administrative tribunals are not 
formally covered by the new rules. Eventually they may adopt 
some rules of their own very like these. 
What is the background of evidence codification in the United 
States? The literature of the early 1930's reveals that scholars 
and practitioners in appreciable numbers in the United States 
found it deplorable that each state and each federal circuit 
seemed to have its own common law of evidence even though 
they shared a common core. This dissatisfaction with the ex-
isting system led to the drafting, in the next several decades, 
of two documents: the Model Code of Evidence and the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, by two prestigious groups of academi-
cians and lawyers. These groups were the American Law In-
stitute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws respectively. These two groups are prestig-
ious, essentially private or semi-private organizations dedicated 
to law reform. The Model Code was regarded as somewhat 
radical in its proposals and therefore the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence were drafted to be more practical and superseded it, 
while preserving much that was good from it. Your Code in-
corporates several of the features of the Model Code, even 
some superceded ones, as well as of the Uniform Rules (and, of 
course, the English reforms). These Codes, particularly the 
Uniform Rules, were recommended by their drafters to the 
states and the federal government for adoption, but very few 
states formally subscribed, although judges have often used 
them as influential textbook-type statements. 
In the late 1960's California did its own thorough-going re-
vision and codification of its own evidence law, using, princi-
pally, the Uniform Rules as a point of departure. But the final 
California product made many modifications. 
In 1961 the federal people got into the act. The formal ad-
ministrative organ of the federal courts, known as the Judicial 
Conference, issued a report concluding that a uniform body of 
federal rules of evidence was desirable for federal courts. In 
1965 the Chief Justice of the United States therefore appointed 
a drafting committee known as the Advisory Committee which 
between 1968 and 1972 circulated to the bench and bar for 
comments two successive drafts of the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence. The principal difference between the two drafts was 
in the hearsay rule. The first draft just about abolished the 
hearsay rule, and in this respect it is somewhat similar to your 
proposed Code. Th·is met with considerable opposition on the 
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part of the practising bar, and so a second draft came out that 
substantially reinstated the hearsay rule, but in· considerably 
eroded form compared with its common law contours. 
Representatives of nearly every aspect of trial-related law 
were on the Advisory Committee - academicians, judges, civil 
and criminal trial lawyers from both sides of the case, etc. 
Their drafts of the Federal Rules of Evidence owe an appreci-
able debt to the Uniform Rules and to the California Code. In-
deed, some of the same drafters of the three earlier codes also 
sat on the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee. 
In November 1972 the drafts of the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence seemed to be ready for finality, and so the Supreme 
Court of the United States approved the draft for use in all 
federal courts, to take effect automatically without further 
enactment on the following 1st July, which would be 1st July 
1973. 
But then the rules hit a snag. Before their automatic ef-
fective date, Congress got into the act. Congress suspended 
the rules until Congress could take a closer look at them and 
examine each of them in detail. Congress's dissatisfaction cen-
tered primarily on the privilege and hearsay provisions. Some 
congressmen still didn't like it that the hearsay rule was be-
ing restricted. The trial lawyers in Congress loved the old 
hearsay rule and didn't want to see it restricted the way these 
rules did (and your Code does even more). 
Let me examine the problem Congress had with privileges, 
which was probably the principal problem. The Supreme Court 
draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence prescribed an exclusive 
list of privileges much like the ones in your proposed Code. 
Congress felt that such an approach did not defer enough to 
the state law of privileges, which many congressmen thought 
should apply not only in state courts but in federal courts 
as well. After all, they argued, states have reasons, policies, 
for having privileges,. For example, lawyer-client privilege. 
States want to encourage state lawyers and state clients to 
communicate. Or doctor-patient privilege. The states want 
to encourage state doctors and state patients to communicate 
fully in the interests of better health care in the state. They 
won't communicate fully if they know there's no privilege 
shouJd the matter get into a federal court. There's a great 
likelihood matters do get into federal courts. So what good 
does it do for the state to have a privilege if the federal court 
doesn't respect it? That was the argument. 
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In addition, the list of privileges failed to contain some of 
the privileges that were favoured by many congressmen. A 
general physician-patient privilege was not there. A general 
privilege covering interspousal communications in civil and 
criminal cases was not there. There was no journalist privi-
lege. 
Additionally, the draft contained a broad governmental ex-
ecutive information privilege (almost identical to the one in 
your proposed Code)· and this really irritated the congressmen, 
who were at that time chafing under President Nixon's exces-
sive claims of executive privilege. Some libertarian congress-
men felt this broad view of governmental privilege was espe-
cially bad because ·it went hand in hand with a restriction, 
elsewhere in the draft, of the personal privileges like the hus-
band-and-wife and doctor-and-patient privileges. The rules 
seemed to be broadening governmental privilege while nar-
rowing personal privileges. You see, the draft did not provide 
for privileging confidential private citizen relationships except 
for a very narrow list of specifically enumerated ones. It was 
not like your Code, which does privilege confidential profes-
sional and family relationships quite generally. I might say 
that your draft would not have satisfied these congressmen be-
cause even though your draft does privilege family and pro-
fessional relationships, it does so only in a half-way fashion. 
It grants a qualified privilege. The judge can balance various 
factors to see whether he wants to accord a privilege or not. I 
submit to you that this really does not effectively foster the 
policies behind the privileges. The purpose of these privileges 
is, I assume, largely to encourage full communications. Are 
people going to be encouraged to communicate when they know 
that they may or ·may not have a privilege, depending upon 
what a judge rules? I do not think so. I think if you really 
want to encourage them to communicate, you have got to tell 
them that they definitely have a privilege. 
The height of the Watergate affair was a very bad time to 
put forth a draft with a broad executive privilege. Further-
more, it was probably a Watergate-engendered sensitivity that 
made Congress reluctant to cede any power to any other branch 
of government, whether it be to the executive or the judiciary. 
Thus Congress was not about to allow the judiciary to unilater-
ally adopt rules of evidence without Congress getting into the 
picture. Especially was this so since many of the matters in 
the Code, such as privileges and other provisions, especially 
provisions applying to criminal cases, were perceived to affect 
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matters outside technical courtroom conduct, possibly reach-
ing into fundamental liberties in the daily activities of citizens. 
For these reasons Congress wanted to play a role. Overlay-
ing it all was a feeling that perhaps codification was not need-
ed, but this did not prevail. New areas of controversy surfaced 
once Congress opened the rules, but finally, after a House draft, 
a Senate draft and a compromise draft, the rules were enacted 
and became effective on 1st July 1975. In broad outline they 
were about 90 per cent what the Supreme Court draft had 
provided anyway. They are also very like your Code. About 
80 per cent attempts to codify the common law. But you can't 
codify the common law in the United States. It has many 
different stands, many conflicting views. In most cases our 
Code took the majority view; but in many it codifies a minor-
ity view. There is very little that is made up out of whole 
cloth and brand new. Privileges were, under the final enact-
ment, left to common law or to state law, depending on the 
kind of case; and a compromise was reached cutting back on 
liberalization of the hearsay rule. 
I hope in the time allotted that I have given you at least 
the general flavour of our Code and a hint of what you can 
expect from yours based upon our experience. I thank you 
very much for your indulgence and for inviting me to such an 
informative and splendidly organized program. 
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